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Employer Behavior in Certification
Elections and First-Contract Campaigns:
Implications for Labor Law Reform
Kate 1. Bronfenbrenner
Organizing is an extremely risky and arduous venture for American workers.
As the experience of the last twenty years has shown, a combination of
unfettered employer antiunion behavior and weak and poorly enforced labor
law make for an "unlevel playing field" stacked against unorganized workers
and unions. Using survey data from private-sector certification election and
first-contract campaigns, this chapter will first examine the impact ofNLRB
practices and legal and illegal employer behavior on union election and first-
contract oUtcomes. It will then evaluate how labor law reform would reduce
the ability of employers to undermine workers' efforts to organize and win
first agreements.
Although there has been a great deal of research on the relationship
between employers' unfair labor practices and election outcomes, there has
been very little research on the broad range of legal and illegal tactics used by
employers during the NLRB election process, regardless of whether unfair
labor practices were actually filed. Even fewer studies have controlled for the
influence of bargaining unit demographics, organizer background, and union
tactics during organizing campaigns. In addition, only a handful of studies
have examined employer and union behavior during first-contract cam-
paigns, even though a union election victory is at best Pyrrhic without a first-
. contract victory. This study can therefore pr'hvide new and important insights
into the impact of NLRB practices and employer behavior on election and
first-contract outcomes as well as the need for and ramifications of significant
labor law reform. I
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Hypotheses
1~
This study will test the hypotheses that NLRB practices and legal and
illegal employer behavior playa significant role in determining union success
in elections and first agreements and that specific labor law reform will
substantially diminish the negative impact of these factors. Variables relevant
to labor law reform during the organizing drive include the number of days
between petition and electior1, the percentage of cards signed, unit challenges, .
discharges for union activity, employer promises of improvements in wages or
benefits, wage increases, captive audience meetings, company mailings, and
unfair labor practice charges and complaints.
Variables to be examined during the first-contract campaign include
election objections; postelection discharges, threats, and promises; unilateral
changes in wages and benefits; staffing changes; captive audience meetings;
full or partial plant shutdowns; the use of surface bargaining and other hard
bargaining strategies; decertification drives; and attempts to undermine the
committee and divide union membership.
The proposed labor law reforms include recognition after a majority card
check; a consistent community of interest standard for unit determination;
more vigorous and speedier enforcement of NLRB penalties for unfair labor
practices, including discharges, threats, promises, unilateral changes, and
refusal to bargain; financial and injunctive relief for more egregious viola-
tions, especially 8(a)(3) and 8(aX5) charges; greater access for union organizers
to the company premises; and stronger restrictions and penalties for employ-
ers that shut down operations or contract out work to avoid unionization.
.
Data and Methodology
This chapter relies on data collected for my dissertation, entitled "Seeds of
Resurgence: Successful Union Strat~gies for Winning Certification Elections
and First Contracts in the 1980's and Beyond" (1993). Although the primary
focus of that research was to determine which union strategies had the most
positive impact on union certification election and first-contract outcomes,
the study also included a wealth of data on employer behavior and other unit
and election background variables.
This study is based on a random sample of 261 NLRB certification
elections that took place between July 1986 and June 1987. Only single-
union elections involving AFL-CIO affiliates in units of fifty or more eligible
voters were included. The data were collected in cooperation with the AFL-
CIa, building on and refining its earlier survey of 189 organizing campaigns
(AFL-CIO 1989). The 261 elections in the final sample represent approxi-
matelya third of the total elections in units with more than fifty during that
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lead organizers for each of the campaigns completed a lengthy survey
regarding their backgrounds, bargaining unit demographics, company char-
acteristics and tactics, and union tactics. In addition, for 100 out of the 119
bargaining units in which the union won the election or won a second election
between the election and the time the survey was completed, follow-up
interviews were conducted with the union representative in charge of contract
negotiations. The second survey included questions regarding the bargaining
dimate, the negotiation process, the negotiator's background, employer and
union characteristics and tactics, as well as the outcome of bargaining.
Descriptive statistics were calculated for each of the NLRB practices and
employer behavior variables to provide an in-depth portrait of the extent and
nature of employer behavior and NlRB practices during organizing and first-
contract campaigns. In addition, multivariate regression and logit analyses
were used to determine whether specific variables had a statistically signifi-
cant impact on certification and/or first-contract outcome when controlling
for the influence of other election background, election environment, com-
pany characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, management tactic, union
tactic, and union control variables.3
Results of the Certification Election Study
The results of the certification election study document both the pervasive
nature of aggressive employer antiunion behavior during organizing cam-
paigns and the negative impact that current NlRB practices and legal and
illegal employer behavior have on certification election outcome.
.
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n the final sample represent approxi-
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2. There were a roral of 961 single-union elections involving AFL-CIO affiliates in units
with more than fifty voters during rhe period examined. The restricrion on bargaining unit size
focuses the srudy on significant union campaigns rather than on those involving just a handful
of workers. In 1986, union win rates averaged 51 percent in the 2,635 units with fewer than
fifty eligible voters, compared with 37 percent in the 1,236 units with fifty or more eligible
Voters. Because the failure of unions to win larger units is such a critical element of the labor law
reform debate, and because it is more difficult to measure the impact of bargaining unit
demographic and union and employer tactic variables in smaller bargaining units, limiting the
sample to larger units helps focus the study on those units in which union and employer
behavior have the most meaningful impact on election oUtcome.
3. For the organizing study, three different equations were used. The first two equations,
with a dependent variable of percent union vote, used ordinary least squares (OLS) and
weighted least squares (WLS) as the method of analysis; the third equation, with the dependent
variable of election win or loss, used logit as the statistical method of analysis. For the purpose
of this paper, the results for the OLS and logit equations are included. The first-contract study
Utilized just one equation, with the dependent variable of contract win or loss and logit as the
method of analysis. A more in-depth explanation of the methodology utilized in both studies
can be found in my dissertation (1993).
for my dissertation, entided "Seeds of
s for Winning Certification Elections
eyond" (1993). Although the primary
which union strategies had the most
election and first-contract outcomes,
.on employer behavior and other unit
78 Kate L. Bronfenbrenner
Impact ofNLRB Practices on Election Outcome
One of the primary concerns of the labor movement is the lengthy delays
between the time a petition is filed and the election is held. In this study,
delays ranged from less than a month to more than two years. As we can see
from table 5.1, the win rate was much higher in units in which the election
was held less than two months after the petition was filed (53 percent) than
when the election was held two to six months after the petition was filed (41
percent). For the 6 percent of the campaigns in which delays were longer than
six months, the win rate increased to 60 percent.
This by no means tells us that delays benefit unions. Clearly, delays give
employers a longer time period in which to campaign aggressively against the
union. Many of th~ unions that were unable to maintain bargaining unit
support after lengthy delays may have withdrawn from the campaign rather
than going ahead with an election they were certain to lose. Because only
campaigns that actually went to an election were included in the sample, the
negative impact of delays is therefore underestimated.
The high percentage of campaigns in which there was a majority or near
majority of signed cards makes it clear that if the election were held on the
same day the petition was filed, or if certification could be achieved by card
checks rather than elections, union win rates would nearly double. Although
unions are required to collect signatures from only 30 percent of the unit to
have an election, in more than 73 percent of the campaigns studied, unions
signed up a majority of the unit on cards before the election. In addition, in
more than 84 percent of the campaigns, the unions got within 5 percent of a
majority and might have been able to get a majority signed up if they had
known card signing would result in instant certification.4
Unions did especially poorly in elections in which the original unit the
union petitioned for was changed by stipulation or by order of the board or
courts. Unions won only 23 percent of the elections in those cases in which the
unit was changed, compared with a 47 percent win rate in units that remained
unchanged throughout the unit determination process. When the influence of
other election campaign variables are controlled for, the results further sug-
gest that the percentage uQion vote declines by 4 percent and the probability
I
i
f
f
I
i
t
4. The results for the card check variable are further substantiated by a recent study I
conducted with Tom Jutavich (1994), which esrablished the first-ever national database of
public-sectot union certification campaigns. Several srates, including New York, Washington,
and South Dakora, permit certification through card check for public-sector workers as long as
employers do not contest the unit and/or demand an election. Juravich and I found rhar in rhose
states permitting card checks, the average percentage of the eligible voters who signed cards
was 85 percenr, well beyond the majoriry plus one required for certification. This also
counreracts claims rhar if card signing led to certification rather than to an election, the
percentage of cards signed would drop dramatically.
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80 Kate L. B ronfenbrenner
of the union winning an election declines by as much as 15 percent when the
unit is changed after the petition is filed.
Unit changes appear to have had an especially negative impact in those
campaigns in which the final unit included other unorganized worksites Or
divisions of the corporation. Several unions in the sample lost elections ,
despite winning more than 70 percent of the votes in the unit they originally
petitioned for, because the board added another branch of the company, .
doubling the number of eligible voters just weeks before the election.
The use of participation schemes, team concept, and other employee involve-
ment programs appears to have been an especially effective union-avoidance
tactic for the 7 percent of the employers in the sample that had these programs
in place before the election campaign began. Although the number of cases is
J
tOOsmall to come to any definitive conclusions, win rates were 22 percent
lower in these units, and the predicted negative impact on the percentage
union vote and the pro~bility of the union winning the election were 6 and
22 percent respectively.
Management Tactics during Campaigns
More than 75 percent of the employers in the sample engaged in active
antiunion tactics, including some combination of discharges for union activ-
ity; captive audience meetings; supervisor one-on-ones; wage increases;
promises of improvements in wages, benefits, or working conditions; antiunion
committees; and letters. With the exception of the consultant and discharge
variables, all of the management tactics variables exhibited a statistically
significant negative impact on either percentage union vote or election out-
come when the influence of other election campaign variables were con-
trolled for.
Seventy-one percent of the employers in the sample utilized a management
consultant during their election campaigns. The win rate associated with
campaigns in which the employer used an outside consultant was 40 percent,
versus 50 percent in campaigns in which no outside consultant was used.
The failure of the consultant variable to have a strong negative effect may
be due to a growing trend among larger corporations to use lawyers on
retainer or to hire their own in-house labor relations specialists. These lawyers
and in-house consultants play the same role as management consultants but
do not have to register under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (LMRDA). Fifteen percent of the campaigns used outside lawyers on
retainer, many of whom acted as management consultants in practice though
not in name, bringing to 86 percent the number of units that used some kind
of outsiders during the management campaign. Several employers in the
sample, especially national chains, such as Beverly Enterprises, Inc., had in-
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house labor relations specialists who ran by-the-book aggressive antiunion
campaigns, complete with numerous unfair labor practices. These in-house
human resource specialists may have received the same training and may have
served the same purpose as the outside management consultants, but they
were not counted in calculating the impact of the management consultant
variable.
The lead organizers surveyed claimed that employers discharged workers
for union activity in 30 percent of the campaigns. Although unions filed
8(a)(3) charges in 87 percent of the campaigns ,in which workers were fired for
union activity, complaints were issued in only 43 percent of the campaigns
with discharges. Discharged workers were reinstated before the election in
only 40 percent of these campaigns. In five campaigns, the NLRB ordered
reinstatement after the election had taken place, too late for those workers to
vote and too late to affect the election outcome positively. This meant that
workers were reinstated before the election in only 34 percent of the cam-
paigns in which there were discharges for union activity. Although win rates
averaged 10 percent higher in units in which there were discharges than in
units without any discharges for union activity, win rates were only 37
percent in units in which the union was unable to win reinstatement for any
discharged workers before the election took place.
These mixed results for the discharge variables should not be interpreted as
evidence that discharges for union activity do not have a devastating impact
on workers' willingness and ability to organize. It is very likely that employers
resort to discharges for union activity only during those campaigns in which
the union has a good chance of winning the election. Discharges backfired for
employers only in the small number of cases in which the union was able to
win reinstatement for discharged employees before the election, demonstrat-
ing union power and undermining the employers' ability to intimidate
workers from engaging in union activity. This contrasts sharply with the
majority of elections, in which unions were unable to win reinstatement for
discharged workers before the election. ,
The negative impact of these firings is underestimated in studies ofNLRB
election campaigns insofar as they do not' include the large number of
campaigns that never make it to an election because the employer discharged
workers early in the union campaign. These include campaigns in which
workers are fired after the initial union contact or the first union meeting,
effectively quashing the campaign before it even gets off the ground. These
also include campaigns in which, despite initial majority support, the union is
-forced to withdraw from the election after the employer fires some or all of the
rank-and-file organizing committee, undercutting the union's ability to
organize inside the workplace and intimidating workers from continuing
their support for the union.
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Employers granted wage increases in 30 percent of the campaigns and
made promises of improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions in
56 percent, even though both of these actions can be considered violations of
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA. In addition, employers established antiunion
committees in 42 percent of the campaigns. The win rates associated with
these employer behavior variables were 9 to 20 percent lower than in units in
which these tactics were not used. The results further suggest that the
percentage union vote would decline by 15 percent in units in which the'
company granted wage increases, by 3 percent in units in which the company
made promises, and by 20 percent in units in which management utilized an
. antiunion committee. Similarly, we can predict that the probability of the
union winning the election would decline by 9 percent in units in which the
company gave wage increases and by 13 percent in units in which the
company made promises during the election campaign.
Under the "free speech" provisions of the NLRA, employers have virtually
.I
unlimited opportunities to communicate aggressively with their employees
during union campaigns, at the same time as union access is tightly circum-
scribed if not totally restricted. Under current labor law these employer
communications can and often do include distortion, misinformation, threats,
and intimidation, with very little chance of censure or penalty by the board or
courts.The pervasiveness and intensity of employer communications with the
bargaining unit are measured in this study by both the number of captive
audience meetings held and the number of company letters sent. Union win
rates declined dramatically as the number of meetings and letters increased,
from more than 40 percent for campaigns in which no captive audience
meetings were held or letters sent, down to 18 percent when the employer
held twenty or more captive audience meetings and 37 percent when the
company sent more than five letters during the campaign. The results further
suggest that for every additional letter that the company mails out, the
percentage of votes cast for the union declines by 2.5 percent and the
probability of the union winning the election declines by 1 percent. Similarly,
for every additional captive audience meeting, the proportion of union votes
declines by .2 percent and the probability of the union winning the election
declines by 1 percent.
The primary issues focused on by employers in these forums were strikes,
dues and fines, and plant closings. According to the organizers surveyed, these
messages often included blatant or veiled threats and repeated distortions or
misinformation about the union. Thus, in the atmosphere created by captive
audience meetings, in which the union has no access and little influence, the
coercive nature of the antiunion message can be extremely damaging to the
. .
unIOn campargn.
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ULPsduNngtheCampa~n
Unions filed unfair labor practice (ULP) complaints, other than 8(a)(3)
charges, in 23 percent of the campaigns, but complaints were issued in only
39 percent of the campaign,s in which those ULPs were filed. Overall,
including 8(a)(3)s, unions filed ULPs in 36 percent of the campaigns and
complaints were issued in 53 percent of the campaigns in which UiPs were
filed. Union win rates were slightly lowet" but not at a statistically significant
level, in campaigns in which charges were filed (41 percent), compared with
campaigns in which no charges were filed (43 percent). Win rates were higher
in units in which complaints were issued (53 percent), however, possibly
because NLRB complaints effectively demonstrate that unions can win against
the employer.
These results do not lend credence to those who would argue that existent
NLRB law and practice effectively enforce union and worker rights in the
organizing process. The NiRB failed to issue complaints in 47 percent of the
campaigns in which charges were filed, despite repeated egregious and illegal
employer behavior, including bribes, promises, threats, surveillance, and
misinformation, in numerous cases. In addition, because of their extremely
negative experience with the board in terms of both process and outcome,
many of the organizers in the survey made a conscious decision not to bother
filing unfair labor practice complaints even in cases of blatant violations.
Results from the First-Contract Study
Under our current labor law and in our current economic and political
environment, employers have a number of legal and illegal means to thwart
union attempts to bargain a first agreement. Not surprisingly, a majority of
the employers in the sample used a broad range of legal and illegal tactics to
resist the unions' efforts to reach a first agreement. \Although the sample size
and statistical method limited how many mana~ement tactic variables could
be included in the estimated equation, the following management tactic
variables were incorporated into the model: use of captive audience meetings;
employer use of media, advertisements and public events; unilateral changes
in wages, hours, and/or working conditions; use of an outside consultant or
lawyer; concessionary initial bargaining proposals; discharges after the elec-
tion; and surface bargaining. In addition, descriptive statistics were obtained
for a broad range of other employer tactics relating to the first-contract
campaign process.
As shown in table 5.2, employers continued captive audience meetings
after the election in 21 percent of the campaigns, ran a media or public
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relations campaign in 6 percent, made unilateral changes in 37 percent, and
discharged workers for union activity in 30 percent. Employers used an
outside consultant or lawyer in 61 percent of the campaigns, made initial
concessionary proposals in 18 percent, and engaged in surface bargaining in
37 percent. All of these actions were associated with first-contract rates 10 to
30 percent lower than in the units in which they were not used. When the
influence of other contract campaign variables was controlled for, the proba-'
bility of winning a first contract declined by 34 percent in units in which the
employer ran a media or public relations campaign, by 13 percent in units in
which unilateral changes were implemented as mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, by 13 percent in units in which an outside consultant was used, by
20 percent in units in which the initial proposals were concessionary, and by
24 percent in units in which, according to the union's chief negotiator, the
employer engaged in surface bargaining.s
The weak effect of the captive audience,meeting variable on first-contract
outcome may be explained by the fact that the union has greater access to
counteract the employer's message once the union has won the election. The
results for the discharge variable may be explained by the fact that discharges
after the election may serve more to spur the union to bargain an agreement
that included reinstatement than to give the employer more leverage at the
bargaining table.
Employers engaged in several additional legal and illegal tactics during the
bargaining process that were not included in the multivariate analysis. As
shown in table 5.2, employers engaged in a broad range of hard or bad-faith
bargaining behaviors. These included refusal to respond to information requests
(17 percent of the campaigns) and delay and stalling tactics, such as showing
up late at negotiations, taking long caucuses, and failing to agree on dates for
negotiation sessions (35 percent). Half the employers also bargained hard on
union security language, resisting any agreement on union shop and dues
checkoff clauses until the very end of bargaining, if they agreed at all.
Twenty-five percent of the employers attempted to undermine the union
negotiating committee by offering bribes and promotions and by spreading
rumors about individual committee members. Similarly, a third of the employers
5. The extremely strong negative effect of the employer media campaign vatiable is parcially
eXplained by the fact that employers ate most likely COutilize the media after impasse has been
reached, thus at a poine when the resolucion of the first contract is already in jeopardy,
Newspaper advercisements, radio spots, and public forums are especially effective cools employ-
ers can use co circumvent a union and bargain direcdy with the employees, in order co convince
them and the larger community that they will suffer permanene replacemene, layoff, or plant
shucdown if they fail co accept management's final offer. The effectiveness of this tactic is
increased all the more by the very weak restrictions and penalties that exist under the NLRA for
employer misstatemenes, threats, and promises included in advercisemenes and other public
presentanons.
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Predicted impact on probability
of winning first contract
-
5 % if two months Ot more
-13% if outside consult/lawyer
-21 % if concessionary
-13% if unilateral changes
-8% if captive audience meeting
-34% if media/public campaign
-24% if surface bargaining
-9% if discharges
Note; Including predicted impact on percent union vore and probability of union win for all variables included in the logit equation when controlling for the influence of the
bargaining climare, company and unir characterisric, organizing campaign, negotiaring process and union raeric, and characteristic variables. Staristically significant resulrs in
predicted impact column are in bold for ail variables that were included in equation.
,
Results in bold in percent first-contract rate column were statistically significant in a chi-squared test.
TaNe 5.2. Resulrs ,ySrudy on Firsr Comracrs
I ndependenr variable
Included in equarion
Two months or more before batgaining begins
Chief negoriatot outside consultant or lawyer
Initial employer p~oposals concessionary
Employer made unilateral changes
Changes in wages or benefits
Captive audience meetings after eleerion
Use of media, ads, and public events
Surface bargaining
Discharged workers for union activity
Without reinstatement or back pay
Not in equation'.
Elecrion objections filed
Refusal to respond to information requesrs
Supervisor one-on-ones after election
Increased use of part-time and temporary workers
Increased use of subcontracring
Refusal to start bargaining
Stall the bargaining process
Undermine committee through bribes and rumots
Play one secrot off another
Hard bargaining ovet union security
Offering better package to nonunion workers
Declared impasse and implemented final offer
Forced strike through unacceptable demands
Organized decertificarion campaign
Threatened full or parrial plant closing
Total for 100 cases in sample
Percent of sample
50
61
18
37
26
21
6
37
30
12
01
23
17
31
20
8
18
35
25
31
50
10
7
7
14
25
100
,)
..
,. ,\... ".
\'. ,. ..
86 Kate L. B ronfenbrenner
attempted to divide the bargaining unit by playing one seCtor or interest
group against another, either by job classification, seniority, gender, depart-
ment, or race. In 10 percent of the units, the employer offered better wages to
nonbargaining unit employees than they proposed at the table for the union
employees.
A substantial number of the employers also engaged in more directly
coercive behavior, such as threatening plant closings, forcing strikes, or'
organizing decertification campaigns. Employers threatened a full or partial
plant closing in 25 percent of the campaigns, although they followed through
on their promise to close the plant only 4 percent of the time. In 14 percent of
the campaigns, the employer organized a decertification campaign, and unions
failed to win a first contract in all but four of those fourteen campaigns. In 7
percent of the units, the employer declared an impasse and implemented the
final offer, and unions won first contracts in only four of those seven units. In
another 7 percent of the units, the employer forced a strike by holding to
blatantly unacceptable demands. Unions wer~ able to win a contract in only
one of those strikes.
With the exception of refusing to respon+! to information requests and
granting bet::er wages to nonunion employees (which may just work as an
incentive for unionized employees to fight even harder), the above-mentioned
employer tactics were all associated with union win rates 25 to 50 percent
lower than in units in which these tactics were not used. The negative
differences in first-contract rates for all of these employer tactics were
statistically significant in a chi-square test.
Twenty-three percent of the employers refused to recognize the union as
the certified representative of the bargaining unit and instead filed objections
with the NLRB and the courts to get the election results overturned. Although
the challenges were dismissed without merit in every case, challenging the
election still served effectively to delay the start of negotiations and appeared
to have a negative impact on first-contract success, so that unions won only
70 percent of the campaigns in which the employer filed election objections,
compared with an 83 percent first-contract rate when objections were not
filed.
Implications for Labor Law Reform
The results from this study confirm that labor law reform could substan-
tially improve union success rates in both certification elections and first-
contract campaigns. Based on the number of campaigns in which the union
lost the election even though a majority or close to a majority of the unit
signed cards before the petition was filed, it is clear that the union win rate
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this sample would have been nearly double if employers had been required to
grant recognition after a majority card check, as is the case in some Canadian
provIllces.
The number of cases in the sample in which the union lost majority support
because of an adverse unit determination demonstrates the importance of
restricting the ability of the board and the courts to make changes in unit
determination that go well beyond the community of interest standard. This
is especially true in those cases in which another entire division or workplace
is added to the unit at the last minute. Workers should be able to organize
with workers with whom they have a true community of interest, all at the
same worksite and all in the same general work classification.
The number of campaigns in this data set in which employers engaged in
clearly illegal behavior during the organizing and first-contract campaigns
speaks strongly to the need for more vigorous and rapid enforcement of the
law and more serious penalties for employers who violate the law. NLRB
staffing levels need to be dramatically expanded at the investigation, hearing,
and case-processing levels. The penalties for 8(a)(3) violations need to go
beyond back pay to financial penalties significant enough to act as real
deterrents. Most important, workers and unions need the same injunctive
penalties for egregious employer violations that are so readily applied for
union violations.
The need for stiffer employer penalties is especially apparent in the area of
bad-faith bargaining. As this study shoFed, numerous employers violate
8(a)(5) of the NLRA through unilateral changes, surface bargaining, and
stalling tactics or simply by refusing to cOple to the table. Yet, under current
law, the worst penalty an employer can get for these violations is an order to
bargain in good faith. This points to a clear need for financial penalties or, in
m?re egregious cases, actual settlement orders or interest arbitration.
The ever-expanding "free speech" rights of the employer, in contrast with
the ever-shrinking access rights of unions, allowed many employers in this
sample to mislead, misinform, and outright lie to employees about the union
in captive audience meetings, leaflets, mailings, media campaigns, and public
forums. Labor legislation that would better balance these rights would improve
the ability of workers to make decisions regarding unionization withour in
any way constraining employers from expressing their opinions abour unioni-
zation in a noncoercive manner. The law should be changed to include
financial penalties for threats, intimidation, lies, and distortion, whether
expressed in wrItten communications or in captive audience meetings and
sUpervisor one-on-ones. Equally important, the law needs to be amended to
offer frequent and full opportunities for union representatives to have equal
time and equal access to counteract the "captive" nature of employer
communication.
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The campaigns in the sample in which the employer was able to defeat the
union through the use of permanent replacement workers underscore the
importance of labor law reform to eliminate the employers' right to hire I I
permanent replacements in economic strikes and temporary replacements Idurin~ lockouts: The cases in w~ich emplo.y~rs actively org.a~ized antiunion I'
commIttees, bnbed.
~r u~dermmed organIzmg and b~r~amm~ com~ittee t
members, used partlC1patlOn programs to thwart organIzmg dnves, or miti- %
ated decertification campaigns give strong support to those in the labor i
movement who argue for strengthening rather than diluting the penalties and JI
enforcement of 8(a)(2) violations. f
The last and perhaps most critical area of labor law reform is suggested by
[
the more than 25 percent of the campaigns in which the employer threatened
a full or partial shutdown of the plant and the 8 percent of the campaigns in
which unions lost representation because of plant closings. These campaigns
demonstrate the critical need for some restrictions and/or penalties for employers
that shut down operations or contract out work to avoid unionization. For,
"
under current labor law, employers can take these actions without fear of
penalty and only in the most exceptional circumstances can union internal
and external press ute campaigns force a settlement.
Conclusions
These results make it clear that unqer current labor law organizing is an
extremely difficult and risky venture for private-sector workers. The results
also demonstrate that labor law reforrris that would expand union and worker
rights while restricting and punishing illegal employer behavior could sig-
nificantly reverse the downward trend in organizing. Given thatthe impact of
many of the individual employer tactics on percentage union vote, election
outcome, and first-contract outcome ranged from 10 to 20 percent, these
reforms in combination could bring union election win rates above 80 percent
and first-contract win rates close to 100 percent. These labor law reforms
could also dramatically increase the number of union election campaigns by
greatly reducing employers' ability to crush union organizing efforts before
they get to an election or even a petition.
A word of caution is in order, however. Both the larger certification and
first-contract stUdies made it clear that union behavior also plays an extremely
critical role in determining certification election oUtcomes. As many Cana-
dian organizers have found, labor law alone does not organize workers. There
were cases in this sample, albeit few in number, in which, despite a complete
lack of employer opposition, the union still was unable to win an election. At
the same time, although overall union win rates hover below 50 percent and
first-contract rates run below 75 percent, some unions and some organizers
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are winning elections and first contracts despite labor law, despite an adverse
political and economic climate, and despite aggressive employer antiunion
campaigns. These unions are able to win because they are using creative,
aggressive rank-and-file intensive organizing and first-contract strategies.
In fact, as the findings from my broader certification election study make
clear, union tactics as a group playa greater role in determining election
outcome than any other group of variables, including employer behavior and
NLRB practices (Bronfenbrenner 1993:301).
As union density in the private sector plunges toward 10 percent, it would
be suicidal for the labor movement to depend on labor law reform for its
resurrection. In fact, the only way unions will achieve significant labor law
reform is to go out and organize millions of American workers, who in turn
can lobby Congress and the president for reform.
Unforrunately, time is running out. If the labor movement is going to
reverse the downward spiral before it is too late, it needs immediately to
reevaluate the way it has organized in the past and develop a comprehensive
plan to revamp its organizing structure and strategy. Only then can labor law
reform be achieved and only then can we rebuild an active and vital labor
movement, which is so critical to the very existence of a democratic anCl
humanist society.
,
.
,
"
